Maritime piracy

Maritime piracy

Unlike most of the other organized crime problems, maritime piracy is not a trafficking issue. No contraband is moved, no illicit market serviced. Rather, it is a violent, acquisitive crime that exploits a dense international flow of commercial vessels.

The depth of concern for the problem internationally is amply demonstrated by the levels of co-operation and coordination among naval and other forces from several countries that have assembled in the west Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden to escort ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia and to protect vulnerable shipping. Notwithstanding this unprecedented effort, the vast sea area in which the pirates now operate makes it difficult to patrol and monitor effectively, particularly with the limited resources available.  More resources, in the form of naval vessels and aircraft, are needed and at every opportunity the International Maritime Organization (IMO) encourages Member Governments to make greater efforts to provide the additional naval, aerial surveillance and other resources needed through every means possible.

While there can be no doubt that the eventual solution lies in restoring effective governance in Somalia, the IMO, in the meantime, taken a leadership role in coordinating efforts to alleviate the problem from the maritime perspective.

The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of offences: The first is robbery or hijacking, where the target of the attack is a maritime vessel or its cargo; the second is kidnapping for ransom, where the object of the attack is the crew.

The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a)        any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

            (i)        on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship

or aircraft;

            (ii)       against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b)       any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c)        any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”

The Somali situation is unique in that almost all of the piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. Modern piracy off the coast of Somalia is said to have arisen from efforts of local fishermen who formed vigilante groups to protect their territorial waters. Today, in a situation similar to what has happened in the Niger Delta, the political aims of the pirates have all but been forgotten. While the rhetoric remains, the true end of these attacks is the enrichment of the pirates. Drifting further and further from the Somali coasts, the pirates are attacking commercial freighters, pleasure craft and other vessels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Rather than championing the cause of the Somali people, pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on which so many Somalis depend.

The following article focuses on just one piracy problem: that found off the coast of Somalia, especially in the Gulf of Aden. This area has seen the largest share of global piracy attacks in recent years, and the problem appears to be growing. Somalia is not the only area of the world affected by maritime piracy, however. The Gulf of Guinea in West Africa has long been a high risk area, as are the waters along Bangladesh and the South China Sea.

At present, most of the piracy appears to be conducted by a small number of dedicated groups, with limited ties to militants and insurgents on the mainland. This could easily change, however, as wealth generated through this activity becomes attractive to those who control the landing sites. In relative terms, piracy generates fortunes. In absolute terms, the true figure is unlikely to exceed US$100 million.

Somali situation

Although there have long been pirates based in Somalia, profiting off the commercial maritime flows that concentrate in the area, recent events are a direct product of the social and political chaos that has prevailed in the last two decades. After the 22-year dictatorship of Siad Barre and 18 years of civil war, the central government collapsed in 1991, and the country effectively split into three:

·         The independent north-eastern state of Somaliland;

·         The central semi-autonomous region of Puntland;

·         The south-western state of Somalia.

Today, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia still does not retain full control of the capital, let alone the rest of its sovereign territory. Over three million Somalis depend on food aid, more than a two-third increase from 2007. The country has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. Less than a quarter of Somalia’s children go to school, and the country is about to become Africa’s least literate – data from 2010.

Modern piracy off the coast of Somalia is said to have arisen from efforts of local fishermen, who formed vigilante groups to protect their territorial waters. After the fall of the Barre regime, foreign vessels from Europe, Asia and Africa moved into tuna-rich Somali waters en masse. Unauthorized fishing may have resulted in the loss of nearly 30% of the annual catch. The United Kingdom Department for International Development has estimated that Somalis lost US$100 million to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in 2003-2004, at a time when the country’s GDP was perhaps US$5 billion. There have also been reports of toxic waste dumping in Somali waters. Initially, vessels involved in illicit fishing or dumping were attacked by these vigilante groups, with the end of either extracting taxes or deterring future incursions. One way of securing reparations was to hold the vessel and its illicit cargo until compensation was paid, and over time seizing vessels became an end in itself.

Today, in a situation similar to what has happened in the Niger Delta, the political aims of the pirates have all but been forgotten. While the rhetoric remains, the true end of these attacks is the enrichment of the pirates. Drifting further and further from the Somali coasts, the pirates are attacking commercial freighters, pleasure craft and other vessels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Rather than championing the cause of the Somali people, pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on which so many Somalis depend.

The increased shipping costs have also had a major  impact on the economy, since shipping is traditionally a major source of income for the country. The region’s fishing industry has also been affected. Tuna catches in the Indian Ocean have fallen because of fishing vessels’ fear of piracy. This has had a major impact on countries like the Seychelles, who rely on the fishing industry for up to 40% of their income.

On the other hand, the inflow of ransom money  has had a beneficial economic effect on some localities. For example, Garoowe, the capital of Puntland, appears to be experiencing a construction boom, and even the price of marriage dowries is said to have increased. This ‘dirty money’ is likely to have a negative impact on governance in that region, however, as the purchasing power and influence of the pirates exceeds that of the government.

Piracy is said to be penetrating all levels of the society in Puntland, with a number of ministers being suspected of involvement in piracy. It is also reported to be undermining the traditional leadership influence of many clan elders in Somalia, who are actively encouraging local youth not to get involved in piracy. There have been fears that ransom funds could affect the outcome of upcoming elections in Puntland.

Somali piracy is unique in many regards, as Somalia does not have a natural coastal terrain of the sort that is usually favourable to pirates. Pirates in other parts of the world typically operate in areas with numerous forested inlets and islands, where ships could be hidden from aerial and maritime surveillance while they are being renamed and repainted. Instead, Somali pirates have developed on-land sanctuaries from which they can launch pirate attacks and conduct ransom negotiations. This, no doubt, has affected their choice to focus on hostages rather than cargo. What may have been considered a deficiency has resulted in a very positive outcome for the pirates: the amounts they command for ransoms far exceed what they could have gained through robbery.

Traditionally, Somali pirates have operated from small, fast skiffs, waiting up to 50 nautical miles off the coast for a suitable vessel to attack. But as patrols have pushed them further out, they are increasingly using bigger fishing trawlers as “mother ships”. These larger vessels are usually able to carry several skiffs, as well as weapons (typically AK-47s and increasingly, rocket-propelled grenades).

The visual horizon at sea is normally about three miles. The ability of pirates to locate target vessels in vast expanses of sea has led some to conclude that pirates are being provided with GPS coordinates by informants with access to ship tracking data. Crews of some hijacked vessels have said that the pirates appear to know everything about the ship on boarding, from the layout of the vessel to its ports of call. Calls made by pirates from their satellite phones from captured ships indicate an international network.

From the time of first sighting, it generally takes the pirates some 15 to 30 minutes to board the ship. Once the vessel is targeted, the skiffs attack from a number of directions simultaneously, which usually allows one of the skiffs to approach the vessel unnoticed. Relatively slow ships with low sides, a small crew and insufficient surveillance are more vulnerable to pirate attacks. Pirates do not limit their attacks to one kind of ship, although bulk carriers, container ships and general cargo ships comprise the majority of piracy targets.

In most instances, ransoms are paid in cash and are delivered to the pirates aboard the seized ship. The method of payment may be direct transportation of the money to the pirates by a representative of the ship-owner or even the parachuting of the ransom money. In a few cases, ransoms have been paid to a

trusted third party representative outside Somalia. Upon receipt of the money, the pirates release the hostages and usually leave separately to avoid tracking and capture.

Somali pirates are generally young men raised in a desperate and disorganized society, willing to risk their lives for the slightest chance of something better. The groups themselves are small – perhaps six to 10 individuals – so despite the existence of a number of well-known groups, this would appear to be an endeavour with few barriers to entry. So long as start-up financing is available, there is likely a long list of volunteers willing to sign up. Most use small arms such as AK-47s and shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenades, of which there is an abundant supply in their war-torn country. While clearly no match for a naval vessel, teenagers with automatic weapons in skiffs can easily overcome most commercial ships, since the crews are generally unarmed.

The amount of ransom demanded by the pirate  groups over the past few years has risen from tens of thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands and even millions. According to one  breakdown, the pirates involved in the actual hijacking receive only 30% of the ransom, out of which they must cover their expenses. The armed groups who control the territory where the pirates are based may claim perhaps 10% as a tax, and elders and local officials command a similar share. The financier of the operation may take 20% as interest on the funds advanced, with a full sponsor claiming perhaps 30%.

Implications for response

Somali piracy is another example of a problem caused more by prevailing conditions than by the impetus of any particular group. If armed robbery in any other part of the world routinely yielded takings in the millions of dollars, or even the equivalent of several years’ salary, this activity would be extremely difficult to deter through law enforcement, however harsh. But these rich pickings are available in an environment where there are few alternative sources of income, where war and famine have hardened some to the sufferings of others, and where the chances of being brought to justice are slim. In this context, becoming a pirate may appear to be a rational vocational choice.

Halting this activity will require a change in circumstances. There have been longstanding international efforts to combat hunger, promote development and bring peace to Somalia, and these remain the core of the issue. There may be scope for reducing piracy, however, without waiting until this embattled nation is returned to normalcy. One approach is target hardening. The shipping lines themselves have experimented with a wide variety of security devices, most of which are nonlethal, including water cannons and high-intensity light and sound projectors. The efficacy of these devices remains unclear, but if they could truly repel a military attack, they would likely have wider application in conventional warfare. This sort of technical solution could promote an arms race, with cargo vessels taking on increasingly heavy hardware to avoid being singled-out, and well-funded pirates employing ever more aggressive tactics in response.

Another point of vulnerability lies in the pirates’  information stream. While some attacks appear to be opportunistic, some seem to be aimed at particular maritime vessels. Locating a particular ship at sea without inside information would be extremely difficult. Better securing this information for vessels traversing the danger zone could pay dividends in reduced pirate attacks. Similarly, bundles of currency are of little use if they cannot be converted into the goods and services the pirates desire. Measures to prevent the outflow of this money or the inflow of products (particularly arms, maritime craft and parts, and vehicles) could also reduce incentives for piracy.